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Abstract	
  
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide was supposed to, as its title states, prevent any further
genocides from occurring. In the event the United Nations could not
prevent genocide the convention obligates all member States to intervene
and punish those perpetrating the crime. Despite the existence of the
Genocide Convention the world has witnessed several more cases of
genocide, some of which the perpetrators have either not been punished or
have been punished long after they have committed the crime of genocide.
With a lack of prevention and punishment critics of the Genocide
Convention have labeled it non-effective. Those affected by genocide
declare that justice has not been served and that too often bureaucracy and
back channels have prevented them from obtaining peace.
This Master’s Thesis explores the claim that the Genocide
Convention has been a failure and offers a perspective that includes the
long term affects of the convention and what it has meant to the study of
genocide. This work greatly includes the efforts of the United Nations and
various organizations that are dedicated to preventing armed conflicts that
could potentially lead to genocide. State responsibility is another major
issue discussed throughout this thesis given that in every case of genocide
the State has had a major role. Hope for the future of the Genocide
Convention is the last major theme of this thesis. Despite the many
shortcomings of the United Nations and its member States the convention
can be monumental in preventing genocide.
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Introduction	
  
The phrase “never again” has become one of the most notable vows
of the 21 s t century. It is a vow that has been recited by officials around
the globe signifying their nation’s pledge to prevent and punish those who
commit the crime of genocide. 140 states have signed on to aid in the
defense of humanity in both times of war as well as in times of peace. Yet
some sixty-seven years after this seemingly hallowed vow was etched into
the minds of the international community, we still find ourselves
grappling with what Samantha Power has so appropriately termed the
“problem from hell” 1.

The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide brought to the international stage a call for the world
to define and condemn the crime of genocide. In the years that followed,
colleges and universities around the world have shown their support of the
Convention by creating degree programs dedicated to the study of the
Holocaust and genocide itself. Some of these same schools have even
sponsored travel learn opportunities to send their students to sites where
genocide has taken place so that they can see with their own eyes the
remnants of gas chambers, and hear the stories of struggle straight from
the mouths of survivors. Memorial sites and museums were erected around
1

Samantha Power, “A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of
Genocide” (New York: Basic Books, 2002)
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the world to preserve the memory of the horrors of the Holocaust, and to
help create a future free of genocide.

To the dismay of the remaining survivors of genocide, the world has
witnessed the evolution of crimes against humanity rather than its
eradication. Far from fearing the authority of the convention, perpetrators
have instead become more brazen and ruthless. Suicide bombers and
civilian soldiers stand at the ready to carry out the will of their leaders
and their organizations. Governments supply these organizations with
weapons and combat training instead of condemning them for threatening
the civility of mankind. It appears that there is very little concern for
what the International Court of Justice, the United Nation’s Secretary
General, or any of the contracting parties of the Convention will do, and
has resulted in a heightened threat to humanity.

In the years after the adoption of the convention the world has seen
several genocides. No mass murder could ever be ranked by severity, but
there is certainly an upward trend in the progression of the crime. There
has been an enormous increase in ethnically and religiously targeted
raping and pillaging, public beheadings and suicide bombings. All of
humanity is faced with a problem that won’t simply go away. No
organization has a better understanding of the root causes for the increase

8

of these acts than the United Nations, which despite its promise of
prevention and punishment for these crimes has only partially delivered.

Though it seems that the world has witnessed a rise in genocidal
activity and crimes against humanity since the Genocide Convention came
into force, there have actually been great strides toward prevention and
punishment. The fact that the world has begun to pay more attention to
these kinds of crimes shows that interest in stopping these criminals is
growing. Our daily news circuit includes at least one segment about peace
making in war torn countries and attempts to eliminate the threat of
nuclear arms. These steps are preventative measures and certainly can
assist in keeping disputes from becoming armed conflicts, which could
potentially elevate to acts of genocide.

The fundamental connection between armed conflict and genocide
has been identified and acknowledged through genocide studies and
through the unfortunate circumstance of witnessing genocide again and
again. There have been tremendous efforts made to attack the threat of
genocide at its core by preventing armed conflict. In doing so the
“smaller” issues that could potentially lead to genocide are quelled and
though not always resulting in permanent peace, it does save lives. This is
an example of the developments in methods of prevention. Nations are
sharing information and allowing foreign mediators to assist in their

9

otherwise domestic issues to try and keep disputes from becoming wars
and escalating from wars to acts of genocide.

All of these developments are the result of the Genocide
Convention. Without the Convention the term genocide would not have
criminal or at the very least, lawful meaning domestically or otherwise.
The Convention has created the opportunity for protection from those who
see The Ottoman Turks and Adolf Hitler as models of leadership. The
Genocide Convention ignited a standard for international humanitarianism
that not only sparks political conversations about the safety of protected
groups, but is also grounded in prevention and punishment for the crime.

At the same time criminals with genocidal intent have become more
active across the globe and are adding more people to their ranks daily.
They even operate within some of the party nations of the Convention,
including the United States, France and the United Kingdom. How then
can anyone proclaim the success or the failure of the Genocide
Convention when there has been great improvement and a great deal of
shortcomings? There have been major developments in the methods of
prevention and there has certainly been better efforts made to bring
genocidal criminals to justice. However, there has been an increase in
cases of religious and ethnically motivated armed conflicts around the
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world that have the potential to escalate to genocide. How can progress
and regression exist at the same time?

To understand how, one must first examine the brief background of
the Convention, what it aims to accomplish and its critiques. Within these
margins lie the spectrum of the success and the shortcomings of the
Convention. In reviewing the Genocide Convention it has proven itself to
be a sound tool for the contracting parties and for the rest of the world. It
outlines every act that should be constituted as genocide and makes no
discrimination on who can be held responsible for these acts. The
Convention places upon the contracting parties the responsibility to
prevent genocide and to punish those who commit the crime, which if
otherwise left up to individual nations, may not be treated as a primary
obligation. Despite the Convention’s shortcomings it has been a beacon of
hope for humanity in its efforts to be more humane regardless of ideology,
race, creed, political or national differences.

The	
  Catalyst	
  for	
  This	
  Thesis	
  and	
  Literature	
  Review	
  
The catalyst for this thesis is a travel-learn experience to Germany,
Poland, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the summer of 2013. A cohort of
graduate students majoring in Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Kean
University sought out what remained of the genocides that once plagued

11

the three nations. During the trip the students visited the Sachenhausen
Concentration Camp Museum in Oranienburg, Germany to see the rubble
that used to serve as gas chambers. They then flew to Warsaw, Poland to
visit a Jewish community that has reestablished themselves after having
had most of their congregation lost to the Holocaust. To end the trip the
students visited the Srebrenica-Potocari Genocide Memorial where they
had the opportunity to meet survivors of the Bosnian Genocide and to see
the vast graveyard of Bosnian Muslims and Croatians.

Enlightened and touched by the stories shared by the survivors and
experts that they met while abroad, the cohort of students returned from
their trip wanting to know more about Genocide Studies. The first work
suggested to them by the trip advisor was Samantha Power’s “A Problem
From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide”. Samantha Power is the
permanent representative of the United States to the United Nations and
has contributed much to the protection of human rights. Power has served
as a Special Advisor to both the President of the United States and the
Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights. She has
worked to preserve the freedom of protected groups in the United States
and abroad in relation to the interests of the United States. She has also
dedicated much of her efforts to U.N. reform and served as the Professor
of the Practice of Global leadership and Public Policy at Harvard
University.

12

In her work A Problem From Hel, Power masterfully weaves
together the thread of genocide thus far in our history and outlines the
many times that Americans have failed to step in when they were needed
most. Power prefaces her work by sharing her experience in
Bosnia/Herzegovina where she has seen first hand the lack of response
and concern for the state of Bosnia by her supervisor while working for
the Washington Post. Her supervisor’s actions was appalling and
revealing to her. The rest of the book offered the same appalling and
revealing effect to any reader seeking to learn about the history of
genocide.

The next area of research was on ways in which the atrocities
described in Samantha Power’s book were being combatted. The platform
for that research was the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide. Studying the text of the Convention itself offered
an understanding of how the problem of genocide was being viewed by the
world powers and what were the possible solutions to that problem. Along
with learning about the text it was also very helpful to understand the
scholarly view of the Convention and its drafters. Dr. Paola Gaeta
provided an insightful work entitled The UN Genocide Convention: A
Commentary that was the perfect gateway to the popular and not so
popular thoughts about the Convention and it’s drafters.

13

Dr. Gaeta’s work on the UN Genocide Convention provided sources
of commentary and critical feedback on the Convention that begs serious
questions about the intentions of the Drafters. It inspired a rerouting of
the original argument for this Master’s Thesis by suggesting questions
regarding the applicability of the Convention. Not only did her work
framed the questions, it also gave logical ideas to provide realistic
answers to the issues that keep the Genocide Convention and the United
Nations from seeming so pointless in battle to prevent and punish the
crime of genocide.

One of the other pivotal figures that contributed to the research for
this Master’s thesis was former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Kofi
Annan served as the 7 t h Secretary-General of the United Nations from
1997 to 2006. He shares the 2001 Nobel Peace Price with the United
Nations for his and the organization’s “work for a better organized and
more peaceful world.” 2 Two of his works, Interventions and We The
Peoples: A UN for the 21 s t Century, offered a candid look into the actions
taken by those at the United Nations that worked toward upholding the
aims of the Genocide Convention and other humanitarian international

2

"The Nobel Peace Prize 2001". Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2014.
Web. 11 Jun 2015.
<http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2001/index.html
>
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laws and peace efforts. Annan aims to reassure his readers that the United
Nations is a useful organization and that it is being developed to better
address the issues of the times. His insight on preventing genocide
specifically details the ways in which the UN will address the problem of
genocide and who it views the organization’s part in upholding the
Convention.

A	
  Brief	
  history	
  of	
  The	
  Term	
  Genocide	
  and	
  of	
  The	
  
Convention	
  On	
  The	
  Prevention	
  and	
  Punishment	
  of	
  The	
  
Crime	
  of	
  Genocide	
  
The term Genocide, coined by lawyer Raphael Lemkin, provided the
foundation for the Convention. The experiences of the Armenian
Genocide, that of the Assyrians in the Simele Massacre in Iraq, and the
Holocaust inspired Lempkin to create a name for the heinous actions taken
against populations. 3 The word Genocide was first used in Lemkin’s book,
Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of
Government, Proposals for Redress, in which the new word is defined as,
“the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group.” 4 Genocide is further
explained, “genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction
of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of

3

Raphael Lemkin, “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe”, (New Jersey: The
Law book Exchange, LTD, 1944), 79-82
4
Lemkin, “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe”, (1944), 79
15

a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different
actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.” 5

Lemkin describes the means to committing the crime of genocide by
separating it into two steps. The first step is to destroy the national
pattern of the oppressed group, which is to alienate that group from the
rest of the nation. The second step is to impose upon that group a desired
national pattern. 6 Systematic premeditated attacks on civilian groups with
the intent of destroying those groups physically, mentally or otherwise
was certainly inhumane, but until Lemkin made his argument genocide
was not an international or domestic crime. Genocidal acts, Lemkin
proposed, was something that should be seen as criminal in the eyes of the
world and in the eyes of international law. He made the prevention and
punishment of the crime of genocide his life’s work and began lobbying
for the United Nations and the United States to take a stand on the matter.

Using Hitler and Nazi Germany as the model for how destructive
genocide is to humankind, Lemkin outlined the eight ways in which
genocide impacts a population. Politics was a major tool used in the areas
that Hitler seized. He completely removed each individual government
and its form of governance and imposed German forms of governance. The
5
6

Ibid, 79
Ibid, 79-82
16

Nazis forced all remaining political leaders and officials to change their
names to German names. They even went so far as to change the names of
towns to German names to remove all remnants of the former political
order. 7

The Nazi party made sure to gain full control of the social norms in
the places that they annexed. Hitler removed members of the clergy and
the intelligentsia from the rest of society so as to prevent any resistance
to the newly imposed order. In Poland in particular members of the clergy
were among the leaders of resistance and posed a serious threat to the
regime. SS soldiers would capture these priests and transport them to
labor camps to keep them from leading the people of Poland against
them. 8 Everything in the lands Hitler occupied would be refocused to
support the war effort by the Nazi regime. All materials and goods were
expropriated from the locals and given to the soldiers. In many cases,
those who were allowed to stay in their homes had no choice but to allow
visiting soldiers to live with them while they were stationed in that
particular area. This would affect not only the households that the soldiers
occupied but it would sometimes also change the social makeup of the
entire community.

7
8

Ibid, 82
Ibid, 83
17

Along with the social norms cultural norms too had been replaced.
Hitler implemented a language policy that mandated for German to be
made the national language and the only language allowed for use both in
Germany and in occupied territories. Hitler banned the teaching of other
languages and went so far as to replace non-German schoolteachers with
German ones who taught only the prescribed coursework. Liberal arts
studies were prohibited all throughout grade school and National
Socialism was a mandated study for children. All media was regulated to
only promote Nazi propaganda. 9 In conducting genocide stripping the
victims of their culture is next to physically harming them perhaps the
most impactful components of the crime because as time goes on it
becomes extremely difficult to realign with cultural practices. For
example there were an estimated 11 million Yiddish speaking Jews in the
world. Now it is estimated that only about 600,000 of the world’s Jewish
population can speak Yiddish. 10

One of the most memorable of the cultural control tactics used by
the Nazis was the burning of books. Any literary work that was deemed
contrary to the Nazi agenda was confiscated, thrown in a large pile,
usually in an open area, and burned. Among those burned were works by
Jewish authors, any literature regarding Marxism or communism, books
9

Ibid, 85
“Yiddish Facts”, last modified: 2015,
http://jewishstudies.rutgers.edu/yiddish/102-department-of-jewishstudies/yiddish/159-yiddish-faqs
10

18

about sex education, and works considered pacifist or liberal. One
instance of a Nazi soldier destroying the library of a Jewish seminary in
Poland tells just how much it meant to the Nazis to remove these forms of
culture:

“For us it was a matter of special pride to destroy the Talmudic
Academy which was known as the greatest in Poland.... We threw
out of the building the great Talmudic library, and carted it to
market. There we set fire to the books. The fire lasted for twenty
hours. The Jews of Lublin were assembled around and cried
bitterly. Their cries almost silenced us. Then we summoned the
military band and the joyful shouts of the soldiers silenced the
sounds of the Jewish cries.” 11

Religious and moral restrictions also played a major role. The
clergy and religious leaders were targeted for having the following and
trust of the oppressed group(s) to incite resistance and to help retain faith
that liberation will come. Removing them also removes their belief and
their connection to God and the mainstream society. Imposing the beliefs
of the oppressor minimalizes faith, forcing the oppressed to obey only in
the will of the oppressor. Hitler imposed a ban on public displays of
Judaism and had children over the age of fourteen renounce their religious
affiliation and enroll in the youth Nazi organizations. 12 Some Jews even

11

Lemkin, “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe”, (1944), 85
Ibid, 89

12

19

found themselves serving as informants for the Nazi soldiers, alerting
them to any violations of the rules.

To attack the moral condition of the oppressed group the oppressor
promotes immoral behaviors. For example, the Nazis made the price of
food higher while keeping the price of alcohol relatively cheap in order to
encourage consumption. 13 Without realizing it the oppressed public will
become more susceptible to Nazi propaganda and will still be in fear of
their oppressor but less willing to fight. This tactic is also intended to
draw the attention of the oppressed peoples to the most basic instincts.
This would keep their minds off of the larger issue of obtaining freedom
or regaining their nationality.

To further distract the oppressed groups from focusing on their
liberation, the oppressor interferes or removes the group’s ability to
participate in economics. Without financial investment in the state the
group is even less of a member of that state in the eyes of the oppressor.
Hitler imposed terrible standards of living while seizing the assets of the
Jewish population. He forced them into ghettos in which they were forced
to barter for goods. In many cases those imprisoned in ghettos had to use
a form of money that differed even from that of the German mark. The
Nazis took over the banks and restricted use of those banks only to those

13

Ibid, 90
20

who had converted themselves into the German culture. 14 This was a
luxury not usually afforded to the Jewish population no matter the
circumstance.

Lastly physical and biological regulations were imposed to bring
about the physical end of the oppressed groups. Marriage and procreation
within the group is banned to try and limit the growth of the population. It
was even made illegal for a German to procreate with a Jewish person,
specifically with a Jewish woman being that the Jewish bloodline is
considered to be matriarchal. In Poland, the Nazis would separate the
males from their wives and send them to labor camps to keep them from
producing more children. 15 Many times it would not be to labor camps but
instead to gas chambers and crematoria to be killed in large masses. If
they did make it to a labor camp many of those imprisoned would be shot
down in the middle of the camp for frivolous accusations such as not
working hard enough or simply for stopping between duties.

Hitler’s reign of terror brought to light the threat of genocide.
Intentional systematic killing became an issue that humanity could no
longer ignore. The Armenian genocide had gone relatively unnoticed until
Hitler and the Nazi party mirrored and built upon the tactics used by the
Turks against the Armenians. Thankfully, those at the United Nations
14

Ibid, 85
Ibid, 86

15

21

were able to see that if nothing were to be done to stop Hitler that he
would continue his deadly campaign throughout the rest of the world. One
such person at the UN was Raphael Lemkin.
Lemkin had been a witness to the early stages of the Holocaust. He
escaped from Poland during Hitler’s takeover of Europe and made his way
to Switzerland and then to New York where he would begin his lobbying
for an international ban on genocide. However, it would not come as easy
as stating what he knew was well underway in Europe. Lemkin would
have to impress the United Nations and its member States with a proposal
that truly warranted the signing of an international law.

Lemkin took his proposal for an international ban on genocide to
the Fifth International Conference for the Unification of Penal Law in
1933. He proposed that two crimes be added to the international law code
and that perpetrators of such crimes should be prosecuted wherever they
are. The first was the crime of barbarity, which included destructive
actions directed at individuals and groups. The second was the crime of
vandalism, which included destructive actions against works of art and
cultural objects. 16 He also proposed that a convention be created to
maintain the new laws. Lemkin included in his proposal that each state
that agrees to add these crimes to the international law code should make
provisions to their domestic law codes that support and mirror that of the

16

Ibid, 91
22

international code. In doing so States denounce the crimes both at home
and abroad, giving criminals no place to hide. 17 It would also give the
Contracting Parties the ability to intervene when necessary.

Unfortunately Lemkin’s proposal did not receive much support at
the Conference. It wouldn’t be until after the Holocaust ended that the
world would begin to heed his warnings about the oppressive regimes like
the one created by Hitler, who, if not preempted, would spread the terror
of genocide throughout Europe and beyond. Despite being a living
testament to Hitler’s brutalities Lemkin still had little support from the
United States for the passing of his proposal. It would take until 1946 for
the proposal to gain enough support to make it to a vote, and in 1948,
after having to edit and re-edit the proposal the General Assembly passed
the proposal unanimously. In 1950 Lemkin was able to convince the 20
countries he needed to have the Convention passed into law, and in
October of that year the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment for
the Crime of Genocide became internationally recognized.

The text of the Genocide Convention has been subjected to much
criticism. For many reasons the Convention’s text has both inspired hope
in some and doubt in others. The Convention is supposed to be a
monumental step in mankind’s effort to preserve civility and human life,

17

Ibid, 93
23

however, as some critics have pointed out, the need for such a law also
identifies the disregard for humanitarian laws already in place. To
understand any criticism or praise of the Convention it is necessary to
understand its text.

	
  
The	
  Most	
  Impactful	
  Articles	
  of	
  The	
  Genocide	
  Convention	
  
The preamble of the Convention sets the tone for its contracting
parties and for the future of the Convention itself. It states, “Recognizing
that all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity;
and being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an
odious scourge, international co-operation is required.” 18 First, it
recognizes genocide not as a new crime but as something that has plagued
mankind throughout all periods of history. By stating this the United
Nations as a representative of the civilized world, is taking responsibility
for having allowed genocide to occur until now. It acknowledges that
mankind as a whole has suffered the effects of genocide and that now is
the time to end it. The preamble also requires international co-operation.
It doesn’t ask for co-operation, nor does it suggest co-operation, it
requires global co-operation, effectively making the Convention null and
void without that most important ingredient.
18

United Nations General Assembly, “The Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, (Paris, France, 1946), 174
24

The actual text of the Convention is comprised of nineteen articles.
Of those nineteen the most important for understanding the purpose and
applicability of the Convention are Articles I, II, III, V, VI, and VIII.
Article I states, “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.” 19 This is
the second most important statement. It differentiates the crime of
genocide from war crimes. This is a key separation because it keeps
defense lawyers from arguing that their clients (on trial for acts of
genocide) were acting under the context of war. Article I also binds the
contracting States by the obligation to prevent genocide and the
obligation to punish those who commit the crime. Again, the Convention’s
strong language leaves no room for interpretation.

Article II outlines the actions that constitute as acts of genocide.
The acts are listed as “killing members of the group, causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part,” or any other harmful action taken with
the intention to eliminate and or prevent the livelihood of a particular

19

United Nations, “Genocide Convention”, (1946), 174
25

group. 20 The element of intent part of what makes the crime of genocide
so uniquely different from war crimes and acts of terror.

In Article III the acts that shall be punishable under the Convention
are outlined. Those acts are listed as, “genocide, conspiracy to commit
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to
commit genocide, and complicity in genocide.” 21 Through Article III every
relation to the crime of genocide is encompassed. Everyone that is
responsible for the execution of the crime, even those that do not prevent
the crime, are accounted for and will share the punishment for the crime.
Article IV confirms that anyone found guilty of any of the acts in Article
III will be punished, “Persons committing genocide or any of the other
acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals.” 22 It confirms that no person has immunity from punishment
for the crime of genocide, not even Presidents or other forms of Heads of
State.

Article V is, effectively, what gives the international law domestic
applications. It reads, “The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in
accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation

20

Ibid, 174
Ibid, 175
22
Ibid, 175
21

26

to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in
particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or
any of the other acts enumerated in article III.” 23 Though the Convention
should have an overarching authority over the prevention and punishment
of genocide it is most certainly not as strong bind than that of the
constitutions of its contracting parties. When domestic laws mirror those
of international laws it further validates the international law.

To enforce the law it takes more than the presence of the law, it
also needs a court to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Article VI provides the guidelines for trying those accused of committing
the crime of genocide, “Persons charged with genocide or any of the other
acts enumerated in Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the
State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those
Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.” 24

For cases where a crime was committed in one of the Contracting
States by a person or by persons who are citizens of another one of the
Contracting States, the drafters thought it wise to include directions on
extradition. Article VII outlines the responsibility of States in these cases.
It reads, “Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not
23
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be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition. The
Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in
accordance with their laws and treaties in force.” 25

Article VIII gives each State the “power” to call upon the United
Nations when combating or preventing genocide. The article reads, “Any
Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as
they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.” 26

Though “Lemkin’s law” had finally been passed, it would take some
time before it was truly put into use. The concepts set forth by the
Convention required a level of cooperation that the world wasn’t ready to
commit to. It was evident in the time it took to bring Lemkin’s proposal to
an actual vote despite what Hitler and the Nazis were doing in Europe.
The United States Senate as well as President Eisenhower refused to
support ratification of the Convention. It would take 38 years after the
Convention became law for the United States to ratify. The reluctance
shown by the U.S. and other Member States to ratify shows just how
important it is for the security of mankind to have the Convention in
place. Without the Convention the protected groups of the world would be
25
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vulnerable to genocidal acts with little prospects of security from their
country.

Criticisms	
  of	
  the	
  Convention	
  
Despite being a major step toward a safer world, the Genocide
Convention has undergone great scrutiny since it’s drafting. Critics
question the applicability of the Convention for various reasons. Some are
blinded by their need for instant gratification and others critique solely on
historical facts. Nonetheless, those who have read the text of the
Convention and have offered their critiques either via lecture or by way of
their own work, typically have strong opinions on its drafters and the
Contracting Parties for having agreed to it. However, like all great
movements of change it cannot be immune to scrutiny if it intends to
improve and actually make change.

One of the arguments against the Convention’s text and purpose is
that its aims do not support each other and that instead the obligation to
punish feeds off of the failure to meet the obligation to prevent. The two
aims of the Convention are stated in Article I as if to be two parts of one
whole, but skeptics of the Convention’s practicality, like Paola Gaeta,
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make the point that the obligation to punish is contingent on the failure of
the obligation to prevent. 27 She argues that:
“The

missing

link

between

prevention

and

punishment

is

commission: when situated on a timeline, punishment gives
evidence to commission which, in turn, indicates the failure of
prevention.” 28
She goes on to say:
“Given that the eradication of this ‘odious scourge’ requires the
willingness, indeed the commitment, to set up strong preventive
mechanisms engaging, when necessary, the use of force, the
preference

for

post-factum

criminal

processes,

while

not

surprising, is disappointing: insofar as punishment indicates the
failure of prevention, it would appear that the drafters inserted a
duty to prevent that was designed to be honored by its breach.” 29

What can be expected of a law that is vague when it comes to
punishment? Who would abide by that law if they could get away with
breaking it? People break laws all of the time until they get caught and
are reprimanded. Though they could potentially break those very same
laws again they would think twice before doing so recognizing the threat
of imprisonment or death.
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The joined concepts of the Convention work together in the same
way. The two compliment each other and one would lose its applicability
without the other. Though genocide could be prevented without having to
resort to punishment, punishment still looms over those who consider
committing the crime of genocide. The idea of crime and punishment
exists for that very reason. Without punishment there would be no weight
to the law. That is why domestic laws and other international laws include
sanctions for those that do not adhere to them because one cannot be
taken seriously without the other. The same idea is applied to The
Convention. To ask nations to prevent genocide without including
punishments is to ask them to support a weightless law.

Gaeta’s argument is, however, supported by the continuous failure
of states to meet the obligation to prevent, leaving them no choice but to
resort to punishment. After the Convention became international law the
crime began to occur more often. Just twenty years after the Convention
the Khmer Rouge began their reign of terror in Cambodia. Five years later
the Iraqi government began killing its Kurdish population. In 1994
hundreds of thousands of Tutsi were massacred in Rwanda at the hands of
their rival tribe, the Hutu, and their state collaborators. Around that same
time the killing of Croatians and Muslims broke out in Bosnia-
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Herzegovina. It took until 1998 for the first conviction for the crime of
genocide; even then only one of these cases saw justice. 30

What is widely believed to be a major flaw in the drafting of the
Genocide Convention is that the drafters intentionally neglected to make
States legally liable contributors to genocide. Dr. Gaeta makes this
argument in her work, “The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary”,
“Some of the drafters criticized an amendment proposed by the UK and
forcefully and repeatedly supported by the British delegate, Gerald
Fitzmaurice. This amendment was directed to add a provision stating that
acts of genocide could be submitted to the ICJ [International Court of
Justice] even in cases where it was alleged that genocide was an ‘act of
the State itself or Government itself or any organ or authority of the State
or Government’. The criticisms (primarily by the US, France, the
Philippines, but also by Canada, Ecuador, and China) and the consequent
withdrawal by the UK of its amendment, clearly show that the authors of
the Convention intended only to deal with individual’ criminal liability
for genocide.”
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The fact that the U.S. and other nations tried and succeeded in
debasing the proposal of UK delegate Fitzmaurice makes debunking her
30

“Genocide Timeline”, last modified April 13 t h , 2015,
http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007095
31
Paola Gaeta, “The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary”, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 532
32

argument much more complicated, and to a degree she is correct in her
conclusion. However there was a subtle mention of State responsibility in
a 1947 resolution to the draft Convention that may suggest otherwise. It
read, “Reaffirming its resolution 96 (I) of 11 December 1946 on the crime
of genocide; declaring that genocide is an international crime entailing a
national and international responsibility on the part of individuals and
States;” 32 Though it doesn’t dismiss Gaeta’s point it does suggest that the
Contracting Parties drafted the Convention with State responsibility in
mind and that it was an understanding among the Contracting Parties that
the Convention applied to each State itself.

After learning of the Armenian Genocide and the gory details of the
Holocaust, which are the two of the major influences of the Convention,
that were both carried out by representatives of their respective States, it
left many skeptical of the true applicability of the Convention as well as
the intention of its drafters when there was seemingly a lack of direct
language towards state responsibility. There is no denying that the
wording of the Convention is certainly geared toward the individual, so
critics are right to question the intentions of its drafters. For example
Article IV states that,
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“Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III
s h a l l b e p u n i s h e d w h e t h e r t h e y a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a ll y r e s p o n s i b l e r u l e r s , p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s
o r p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s . ” 33

Scholars who prescribe to this critique look to the Nuremburg trials and to
the nature of most cases of genocide and believe that the General
Assembly made a terrible decision by individualizing the crime.

The decision has led to a feeling among scholars and state officials
that the states involved with the drafting of the Convention had only
themselves in mind and sought to establish the law while being exempt
from it. Professor Bassiouni gave an interesting perspective regarding the
matter:
“’Nuremberg’ focused on individual criminal responsibility for conduct that
was the product of state policy and for which collective responsibility and
state responsibility could have been assessed. Those who established the IMT
were careful to avoid the notions of state and collective responsibility, except
with respect to criminal organizations, namely the SS, SD, and SA. The simple
reason is that these governments did not want to establish a principle that
c o u l d o n e d a y b e a p p l i e d t o t h e m . ” 34

The United States, for example greatly benefited from the
individualization of the crime of genocide and from having major
influence in the United Nations. In 1951, the Civil Rights Congress, an
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American civil rights organization, drafted a petition entitled “We Charge
Genocide: The Crime of Government Against the Negro People”. The
petition was presented to members of the United Nations accusing the
United States Government of having been complicit and for directly
committing acts of genocide against the “negro people”. The CRC claimed
that the Government committed heinous and degrading acts against the
African American population for being “negro”, with the intent to destroy
the entire population both in whole and in part, which according to the
Genocide Convention, qualified as acts of genocide.

Among the evidence supporting the CRC’s claims was the Jim Crow
Laws, which supported segregation of whites from blacks in every facet of
American life and encouraged white Americans to inflict physical,
psychological and economic harm on African Americans. As a result of
these laws and the culture they created it had become a normal practice in
business to systematically disenfranchise African Americans by
deliberately not hiring them. In situations where blacks were hired they
were only allowed to have the lowest paying positions. Legislation was
passed in some states to keep blacks from being eligible to vote. For
example state polls implemented literacy tests, which would prove to be a
challenge to the African American voting population because most of
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them, to that point, had received low quality education and in many cases
could not read at all.
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Blacks were forced to live in ghettos with substandard housing
accommodations. Lynchings of African Americans had become public
spectacles where an entire town would attend to witness the horrible
occasion. Between 1882 and 1929 approximately 3,306 African Americans
had been lynched nation wide with the majority of occurrences happing
within the confederate states. 36 Blacks faced violent treatment by the
police across the nation and there was a major lack of medical care and
access to education for majority of the African American population. 37

The United States Government and the media fought the petition.
The Department of Defense even requested that the NAACP publicly
denounce the petition, which the organization almost did but decided
against it due to the fact that the organization was cited as one of the
sources in the petition. Lemkin objected to the petition on the basis of the
birth rate of African Americans. His view was that the plight of Blacks in
America was nothing like the mass atrocities happening in Europe. The
35
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United Nations has no record of the petition and it is believed to be
because neither of the U.S. delegates at the time would take the petition
seriously enough to speak on its behalf. However the petition did make it
to Britain and other European countries. In Europe the public embraced
the document and showed outspoken skepticism of the U.S. Government
for having misused its influence by keeping the petition from reaching the
Convention floor.

By keeping the petition from reaching the tables of U.N.
representatives the United States never had to take responsibility for its
compliance and execution of genocidal acts directed at its African
American population. Perhaps if there was stronger language included in
the text of the Convention at that time regarding State responsibility other
nations would have stepped up and pushed for the petition to be officially
reviewed by the General Assembly. Instead the “We Charge Genocide”
petition is nothing more than a dead document drafted by a disbanded
organization.

Addressing	
  The	
  Criticism	
  
Professors Gaeta and Bassiouni’s points are strong regarding the
reasoning behind states electing to individualize the crime of genocide.
However, instead of directly solving the issue of not making states
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directly responsible their points only lead to more questions; can an entire
State be complicit in the crime of genocide or if it should only be the
individuals who undertook to commit the crime that should be held legally
responsible? The problem with holding an entire State responsible for the
crime of genocide is that it could throw a State’s political and economic
make up into disarray. For instance if an entire branch, or the leadership
of every office within the U.S Government that signed off on a decision
that was found to be complicit in or active in committing the crime of
genocide was to be held responsible for the crime of genocide it is likely
that the Republic itself would implode. In a democracy like the one
practiced in the U.S. the line of command would essentially be exhausted
if the current leaders were removed from their positions, leaving the
nation without a government until the lengthy process of elections were
completed.

Nonetheless, the fact is that without aid from a government or some
branch or organization funded by the government genocide is almost
impossible to commit. It truly seems unjust to leave states out of the
wording of the Convention knowing the amount of resources it would take
to perpetrate such a crime. Taking an “individual approach” to
establishing the international criminal law of genocide left a large gap in
the law itself. If a single person or a small group can commit the crime of
genocide then why could a nation not do the same? Comparing the ability
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to commit the crime between individuals and nations leaves a truly
lopsided argument. Given the fact that governments have played major
roles in all of the known genocides it would be not just helpful to include
specific language regarding state responsibility, it is absolutely necessary
to do so if the crime of genocide is to be punishable.

The very idea that a single person could commit something so
elaborate is far-fetched. Surely one man or woman could take actions to
commit the crime, however, it would take a great deal of time, man power,
and resources, all of which would more than likely lead to the discovery
of their plan before they could actually complete it. A small cohort of
people would have the man power to make pulling it off somewhat easier
but would still require access to the necessary resources. The only way for
small groups of people to commit the crime of genocide is to be at the
helm of a nation or to have the support of a nation or its representatives.

For example the genocide of the Tutsi population in Rwanda was far
less likely to have happened if not for the earlier involvement and
mishandling of the situation by the German and Belgian colonial officials.
Tutsi and Hutu clans traditionally distinguished themselves from one
another based on class and not ethnicity. Belgian missionaries sent to
Rwanda to oversee the governance of the State implemented the idea of
racial superiority by introducing foolish criteria such as the length of ones
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nose as a means to distinguish aristocracy. 38 Only with the influence and
support of the Belgian officials did the Tutsi begin to discriminate against
the Hutu by forcing them into menial jobs, keeping them out of political
positions and forcing them to carry identification cards describing their
ethnic background. This would be the precursor to the backlash from the
Hutu majority once they able to acquire political power, which was also
supported by Belgian officials, that lead to the slaughter and displacement
of over 200,000 members of the Tutsi clan.

Prior to the arrival of colonial masters the people of Rwanda did
not oppress each other. There was certainly no build-up to armed conflict
and much less toward the genocide of any of the three populations that
inhabited the country. Though the Hutu and Tutsi had their differences it
was Belgian officials that created racial issues between the two clans. It
was Belgian officials that allowed one clan to oppress the other, creating
major tensions, and then not balancing out the political arena once the
oppressed population gained political power. The Rwandan genocide was
very much the product of the German and Belgian colonialism.

Offenses that could be attributed to a single individual are the more
“secondary” means such as conspiring to commit the crime of genocide,
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and complicity in
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genocide. 39 Even then the individuals being accused of these crimes must
poses a certain amount of power before any sane minded person would
take them seriously enough to assist them in committing genocide. This
does not mean that individuals within State parties cannot commit the
crime of genocide. Professor Bassiouni put it best when he stated:
“In all cases, individuals commit crimes. What is called ‘state action’ and
‘state favoring policy’ does not alter the fact that one or more individual
authors are involved. The characterizations of ‘state action and ‘state favoring
policy’ refer to collective decision making and actions by individuals who
develop a policy or who execute a policy or carry out acts which constitute
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i m e s u n d e r l e g a l a u t h o r i t y . ” 40

However, if those individuals use the apparatus of the State to
commit the crime then the State must bear some responsibility.

There should be exceptions made for those persons who attempted
to prevent and or stop the criminal acts, as they have clearly shown no
complicity to the crime. There should also be constraints on how the
entire state would be punished so as not to stifle the freedom or prosperity
of the state. Despite the inhumane nature of the crime punishment should
not exclude the eventual rehabilitation, forgiveness, and reconciliation. If
even one of these principles were left out the authority handing out the
punishment would be no better than the perpetrators of the crime.
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Gaeta makes another argument that is perhaps a bit “picky” on the
wording of the Convention. She makes the claim that the Convention does
not prohibit the Contracting States from committing the crime of
genocide. 41 Suffice it to say that it is important to include every possible
outcome when drafting a law. In doing so one encompasses every
possibility for committing the crime that the law seeks to prevent.
However, it can be, and most likely was assumed by the United Nations
that a Contracting Party would refrain from committing the crime of
genocide if they are pledging to prevent and punish those who do. Those
Parties who confirm the text of the Convention by doing so also agree not
to commit the crime.

Her mentioning this point is, though unnecessary, is not completely
frivolous. As mentioned States are capable of carrying out an act of
genocide. It would make a more compelling argument to suggest that the
Convention is predicated on something that is hard to guarantee:
international cooperation, prevention at the State level, and punishment at
every level. The Preamble of the Convention all but demands that the
Contracting Parties cooperate when it states that international cooperation
is required to win the war on genocide. 42 How then does the United
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Nations make sure that these demand are met? History says simply that it
cannot while the future assures that it can and will.

	
  
The	
  Scope	
  of	
  Prevention	
  
	
  
To gauge the limitations on the United Nations to guarantee that the
Convention will be upheld by its Member States it helps to understand the
three requirements placed upon the Contracting Parties. Preventing
genocide has been one the most challenging goals to meet for the United
Nations. Most scholars see the Convention as a failed and useless
international law because prevention has eluded the Contracting Parties
ever since it came into force. There has been much progress in providing
and implementing preventative measures to intercept criminals and to
quell conflicts before they reach the point of genocide. Nonetheless there
is still much more to be done to assure that preventative measures have a
lasting effect wherever and whenever they are implemented.

The concept of prevention is hard to articulate, especially when it
comes to armed conflict. It is a concept that includes such elements like
control, force, and in many cases intervention- all of which make world
leaders extremely uncomfortable. The idea of prevention has tested the
world’s commitment to the international safety from the very conception
43

of the Convention and has proven to be one of, if not the major roadblock.
Political leaders fear that their sovereignty will be denigrated, that their
citizens and their neighbors will no longer believe in their nation’s ability
to protect its people if they allow other nations to have instant authority
on their shores, even in the special circumstances of preventing genocide.

The truth is that no nation is impermeable to the horrors of
genocide. Even when it occurs in other nations it affects us all as a
civilized society of human beings. In the battle to end armed conflict,
specifically genocide, the fact that this fear of losing power is still
driving wedges between nations is proof that the Convention has had
mostly conditional priority to our leaders. Former Secretary General of
the United Nations Kofi Annan has dealt with these fears first hand. He
waded through them during his time in office and notes that our leaders
still have yet to overcome that fear. In his presentation on the Carnegie
Commission on the subject of preventing deadly conflict, he shared his
disappointment with the lack of international collaboration:

“And yet we seem never to learn. Time and again differences are
allowed to develop into disputes and disputes allowed to develop
into deadly conflicts. Time and again, warning signs are ignored
and pleas for help overlooked. Only after the deaths and the
destruction do we intervene, at a far higher human and material
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cost and with far fewer lives to save. Only when it is too late do
we value prevention.” 43

History has proven the former Secretary General right; nations do
not value prevention as much as they should. It begs the question then: if
our leaders don’t value prevention then why would they agree to the terms
set forth by the Convention? Perhaps the issue isn’t so much that we don’t
value prevention but that we don’t yet know how to prevent genocide; we
certainly didn’t when the Convention was made into law. When the
leaders of our nations signed on to the Genocide Convention it is possible
that they were acting out of impulse. For some countries this was an
opportunity to seek the security needed to help stabilize their
governments. For others it was peer pressure or fear of missing out on an
opportunity to have a say during the development of a monumental
convention.

Though the Holocaust was not the first time mankind had fallen
victim to the horrors of genocide it had yet to be identified as an
international crime. This new crime therefore demanded of the world
leaders something that they had always seemed to avoid: unselfish
international collaboration. Winston Churchill described it as “a crime
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without a name.” 44 Before Lemkin genocide was seemingly an anomaly
that left the world powers with an extremely difficult decision to make.
Do they stand by the claim that nations have the right to sovereignty over
their domestic affairs, even when they threaten the security of their
minority populations? Or do foreign nations have a responsibility to band
together to assure that all people everywhere can count one another to
come to their aid when their own governments cannot or refuses to?
Lemkin’s argument eventually won over the parties of the U.N. but that
was only a third of the battle.

Applying	
  Preventative	
  Measures	
  
Preventing genocide would be an even bigger challenge than
expected. The U.N. was tasked with creating measures that would
intercept the crime before it happened. Which begged the question: how
do you identify genocide in the making? What factors or actions should be
seen as preparation to carry out the crime of genocide? Developing a
model for preventing genocide would take years and still has yet to be
perfected. However the strides towards accomplishing prevention have
been great.
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The United Nations has received much assistance from the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, who has established a Commission on
Preventing Deadly Conflict. In 1999 they were able to help identify a
“formula” or strategies for accomplishing the task of preventing genocide
that if implemented could greatly reduce the threat of armed conflicts that
have the potential to escalate into genocide. The Commission breaks
genocide prevention into two categories: the first is “operational
prevention” and the second is “structural prevention”. 45 The “operational
preventive strategy” includes early warning, preventative diplomacy,
preventative deployment and early humanitarian action. 46 The “structural
strategy” includes preventative disarmament, development and peace
building. 47 Both categories of strategies offer the potential for a great
amount of good, however many of the strategies rest upon faulty
foundations.

Preventative deployment, which is the deployment of UN troops
along and within the borders of nations that show signs of rising armed
conflict for the purpose of monitoring those conflicts and trying to
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contain them, has proven to be a successful strategy. 48 Particularly in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia preventative deployment helped
the newly independent state obtain stability. The UN troops were
stationed there from 1995 until 1999 and helped keep out any illegal flow
of small arms that might have aided NLA or KLA rebels in toppling
Macedonia’s stride toward independence and recognition. 49 The presence
of the troops may have also kept the fighting in Albania from spreading
over into Macedonia, which at the time consisted of a one fourth Albanian
population. 50

Preventative diplomacy, the most common method of preventing
any armed conflict, has been increasingly effective over the past two
decades. The United Nations has committed itself to creating
opportunities for conflicting parties to engage in discussion in order to
seek a resolution to their differences. Through its Department of Political
Affairs in 2006, a Mediation Support Unit has been created to send
mediators to places of possible conflict to help direct the process of
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establishing peace. The Department has even established a standby team
of mediators who are “on call” at the need of the mediators on site. 51

Humanitarian action, the last of the “structural prevention”
strategies is also a common method used by nations attempting to quell
conflict, specifically in the developing world. The UN and NGOs
typically are the ones contributing to these efforts but some nations, on
occasion, have been willing to provide assistance to allies and those in
need. In many cases where civilians are under threat of becoming
collateral damage, or when they are directly attacked, the international
community is very quick in their response to helping the victims. Today’s
rapid stream of media amplifies the pressure for governments to assist in
humanitarian efforts, which greatly contributes to a nation’s willingness
to assist long term.

The “structural” preventative measures too have had positive
applications in the war on genocide. Preventative disarmament is a key
strategy in calming a quickly rising conflict. Simply put, if a killer has no
weapon he is more likely to either run from the conflict or become open to
the idea of resolution. In either case the armed phase of the conflict has
ended and it is likely that there will be far less if any casualties at all.
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Development and peace-building though set as separate strategies
in the Commission’s evaluation are in fact part of the same phase of
preventing genocide and other forms of armed conflict. Genocide can
occur anywhere but specifically in “third-world countries” often
economics and hardship are paired with age-old religious and ethnic
rivalries. Class prejudice, religious and racial differences have been the
root of many armed conflicts. Aiming directly at those core issues not
only stops armed conflict while it is happening but it can certainly be a
powerful tool for preventing it.

In 2014 the United Nations improved upon the Carnegie
Commission’s efforts. It released a publication entitled “Framework of
Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention”
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that gives one of

the most comprehensive outlines for identifying risk factors that could
lead to genocide. The publication divides the risk factors into two
sections: the first being common risk factors and the second being
specific risk factors. 53 The common risk factors are factors that affect the
entirety of the state while the specific risk factors pertain to situations
that directly involve or target specific groups.
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The common risk factors, when identified and intercepted, could be
the best means of preventing genocide. Of the common risk factors armed
conflict or other forms of instability are among the most common. These
kinds of situations are ones that place the State under duress and can
create an environment conducive to armed and unarmed conflict. An
example of this situation would be that of the collapse of Yugoslavia and
the outbreak of fighting that would eventually lead to the Bosnian
genocide. A way to detect the potential for armed conflict is to review a
record of serious violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law. If a State has a history of treating its citizens, in whole
or in part, in an inhumane way it is quite likely that the State could
potentially either commit or become complicit in genocidal activity.

The example of the former Yugoslavia is also a case where there
was a major weakness in the state structure. Circumstances such as the
disbanding of the former Yugoslavia are circumstances that negatively
affect the ability of a State to prevent atrocity crimes that could
potentially result in armed conflicts and genocide. Without a stable or
willing government it is very likely that this State could see a high level
of conflict. In Srebrenica Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats were left
defenseless against the Serbian Army. Neither the State nor the United
Nations troops could (or would) protect them. Even when refugees made it
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to the compound only about 2,500 were to be allowed in. Sadly even those
who made it in would be released to face their deaths.

Motives or incentives are sometimes tough to identify early enough
but they remain a key factor in identifying a crime as genocide. These are
the reasons that perpetrators of genocide use to justify the use of violence
against protected groups. In the case of Germany after WWI, it was
relatively easy for Hitler and the Nazi Party to convince the dispirited
German public to support the Party’s aims after having lost in the war and
in the midst of a deep economic crisis. The Nazi Party created an “other”
out of the Jews and every so-called “non-Arian” and used their creation to
fuel hatred throughout the nation, resulting in the enslavement,
displacement, and death of approximately six million.

Another major risk factor used to identify and prevent possible
armed conflict is to monitor the capacity of a state or other actors to
commit atrocity crimes. It is not enough for a state or group of actors to
be motivated to commit an atrocity crime; they must also have the
capacity to commit the crime. Though Germany was doomed to pay for
their participation in WWI, Hitler was able to galvanize manpower
through propaganda and by removing outside influence from public view.
By doing so he manufactured the support of the entire country. Those who
didn’t support the ideals of the party were made to work in factories to
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make the weapons that would be used against other decenters and “nonArians”.

When there is the absence of mitigating factors or when the State’s
armed forces lack in numbers, equipment or training, or the State does not
have the ability to call upon forces that could prevent armed conflicts
then it is more likely that genocide will occur in that state. States must be
willing to ask for and allow other nations with respectable armed forces to
assist them in cases of armed conflict, especially in matters of preventing
and stopping genocide. The United Nations does make itself a beacon in
regards to matters of genocide, but where the organization is sometimes
flawed is in situations where peacekeepers are sent to are as in need of
soldiers.

In the case of Rwanda, UN peacekeepers were sent to oversee the
conflict rather than intervene, costing thousands of lives. They were under
strict orders to simply keep watch over the area and ensure that the Hutu
and Tutsi were adhering to the Arusha Declaration. Despite the fact that
many aspects of the Declaration were clearly being violated, the
peacekeepers could nothing about the mass killing they saw as per their
orders. These are just some of the common risk factors. As the study of
genocide grows and more perpetrators of genocide and atrocity crimes are
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brought to justice the more the world will learn and the better able forces
will be at preventing genocide.

The combined analysis of the Carnegie Commission and the U.N.
Framework is proof of the progress made toward prevention. Their reports
encompass all of the pathways to genocide and address all of the links to
armed conflict, which have the highest potential to reach the point of
genocide. Unfortunately it took more instances of genocide in order to
collect the data needed to compose the guidelines. Thanks to the Genocide
Convention organizations like the Carnegie Commission have been able to
bring to the dangers of genocide to the forefront of global security and
humanitarian efforts.

The	
  Obligation	
  To	
  Punish	
  
The obligation to prevent genocide has certainly proven to be a
challenge to uphold. The obligation to punish those who commit the crime
of genocide or any of the other punishable acts in Article III of the
Convention has not been any easier to meet. Unfortunately the United
Nations and the Contracting Parties to the Convention have come up short
on this obligation many times, leaving the survivors of the postConvention era without much closure on their hellish experiences. It
wasn’t until 2014 that the victims of the Cambodian Genocide saw justice
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for the crimes committed against them. Thirty-five years after the Pol
Pot’s gruesome rule over Cambodia ended, two of the only remaining
perpetrators of the Cambodian Genocide, Khieu Samphan who was 83 at
the time, and Nuon Chea who was 88, stood trial in Cambodia, which was
held by a joint United Nations and Cambodian tribunal The Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. They were both convicted of having
committed the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity. 54

Although the two criminals were brought to trial and convicted, was
justice really served? Some survivors struggle to find closure even after
the verdict was reached. One survivor, Sokha Ten Meyer, was asked to
share her reaction to the verdicts of the Khmer Rouge trial. Amidst her
anger from the nightmares she still has from the dreadful experience, she
also asked the obvious question of, “Why did it take so long?” 55 It took
thirty-five years to bring the murderers to trial.

Both men were sentenced to life in prison but were in their eighties
by the time a verdict was reached. Pol Pot himself was never brought to
trial because he’d already died in 1998. Washington Post Journalist
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Elizabeth Becker spent time with Pol Pot while he was in power, covering
him for the paper. She too had mixed feelings about the length of time it
took to convict the criminals of the Pol Pot regime, “As Khmer Rouge
leader Pol Pot’s brother-in-law, Ieng Sary was part of the movement from
the beginning, and had intimate knowledge of it, But this is what happens
when you wait 30 years to bring people to trial—this [his death before he
could be brought to justice] should never have happened. Cambodians
have been deprived of justice. Justice delayed is justice denied,” 56

These are all strong and justified sentiments. The Genocide
Convention had been in force for almost thirty years when Pol Pot and his
followers took over the capital city of Phnom Penh. Again the question
could be asked, “Why did it take so long?” 57 The fact isn’t, however, that
the Convention itself has failed numerous victims. Its text provides for
the required participation of the international community to aid in the
effort to prevent and punish for the crime of genocide. The blame for the
Convention’s shortcomings belongs to the Contracting parties and the
United Nations for allowing minimal action on the part of other States, as
well as for allowing such an extended period before the trial.
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Hope	
  
Yet, even in its shortcomings, there is still great potential for the
Convention and the guidelines it has helped to create for preventing and
punishing for the crime of genocide. The analysis can help to set the
precedence for identifying criminals with genocidal intent before and or
after they have committed the crime. Article III of the Convention labels
“conspiracy to commit genocide” and “direct and public incitement to
commit genocide” as punishable acts. 58 These are actions that, if
identified and preempted, could both prevent genocide and help rein in
potential criminals before lives are lost.

Without the third obligation of international cooperation none of
the analysis or actions plans would matter. Without the willingness of the
Contracting Parties to work together there essentially is no Convention
and therefore no stopping the monster that is genocide. The fact that the
Convention needed twenty States to agree to its drafting in the first place,
and that the Convention will no longer exist without the support of at
least sixteen States, 59 shows that without the dedication of multiple States
the law itself cannot be upheld.
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We have seen multiple instances of how humanity suffers when
there is little to no international cooperation in preventing and punishing
genocidal criminals. With each case of post-Convention genocide in
Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Darfur, there was a lack of
participation by the Contracting Parties as a whole. Few times were their
major joint efforts by the Parties, which may have quelled the violence
sooner rather than later.

The rise of global terrorism has posed a unique challenge to the
willingness of the Contracting Parties to cooperate. Terrorist groups like
ISIS, HAMAS, and Al-Qaeda have in many ways violated the laws of the
Convention, yet these groups and organizations are thriving and seem to
add more to their ranks everyday. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) has rooted itself in the northern regions of Iraq and Syria and
remains in control of those areas. The group intends to spread terror and
to establish jihadist nation states around the globe to usher in what radical
jihadist refer to as the “Caliphate” or the “Global Islamic State”. 60

This violent and relentless drive to make the world over in the
image of the so-called “New Caliphate”, poses a threat to every to all
including other Muslims. In most cases conversion isn’t an option, and
when it is but victims refuse they are subjected to torture and death. Other
60
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Muslims especially Shiite Muslims, who disagree with the tactics of these
groups, are also at risk. When these groups invade towns and cities they
force the Muslim and Christian citizens to join their ranks. One CNN
reporter interviewed a teenager in a Syrian prison who tells the reporter
that, “They captured my village and gave me a choice: either join ISIS or
be beheaded.” 61

ISIS and its “affiliates” have been responsible for a number of
human rights violations throughout the last three decades. One of the
group’s most recent acts was the public beheading of American Journalist
James Foley. An ISIS fighter stood over a kneeled Foley who forcibly
read a prompt, which was most likely written by his captors, condemning
the United States for having interfered with ISIS activity in Iraq. 62 After
finishing the prompt Foley was beheaded, live and in front of the world.
Another American Journalist, Joel Sotloff, was brought in front of the
camera by the masked knifeman who then threatened to take Sotloff’s life
too if American President Barack Obama did not call off American air
strikes in Iraq. 63 If left unchecked these groups could grow even larger
and amass the weapons and support necessary to commit acts of genocide.

61

“Breaking news November 2014 ISIS ISIL DAESH mass killings now
target Iraqi tribe”, last modified: November 4 t h , 2014,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E76_m3Xov9g
62
Sekulow, “Rise of ISIS: A Threat We Can’t Ignore”, (2014), 1
63
“Video shows ISIS beheading U.S. journalist James Foley”, last
modified: August 20 t h , 2014,
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/19/world/meast/isis-james-foley/
59

Hamas, the organization of the Islamic resistance movement, has
been just as brutal toward its target: Israel. Much like ISIS Hamas seeks
to help usher in the so-called “new Caliphate” and directly targets Jews
and Christians in Israel. In 2001 a Hamas fighter walked into a Sbarro in
Jerusalem and self detonated a bomb, which was surrounded by nails and
other sharp metal objects. The suicide bomber injured one hundred and
thirty people and killed seven. 64 Hamas is dedicated to attacking, torturing
and killing Jews even if it means sacrificing the lives of its own
followers. In the Preamble of Hamas’ Charter the organizations declares
its intent to rid the Jerusalem of Jews, “Our battle with the Jews is long
and dangerous, requiring all dedicated efforts. It is as phase which must
be followed by succeeding phases, a battalion which must be supported by
battalion after battalion of the divided Arab and Islamic world until the
enemy is overcome, and the victory of Allah descends.” 65

These groups have launched missiles at Israeli civilians and their
homes almost weekly. They’ve built underground tunnels that lead next to
and into public buildings such as schools, masques, and temples in order
to deploy their “soldiers” throughout civilian neighborhoods. These
terrorists have resorted to using human shields, many times not caring
about whether or not the person is Jewish or Muslim. Christian civilians
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and travelers have been kidnapped and publicly beheaded by members of
these organizations and the footage of these vicious occurrences has often
been made public via the Internet. Still somehow the powers of the United
Nations have not found a way to prevent these horrible events from
happening. Again, if these acts aren’t stopped, and these organizations
aren’t dismantled, genocide may be the next step in achieving their goals.

Global jihadist terrorism is a threat that neither prevention nor
punishment can outright cure. ISIS and Hamas insurgents have pledge to
fight until the Caliphate rules the world. How then do you prevent them
from doing so? Diplomacy will not stop them because to them there is no
compromise to be made. If they will continue to commit crimes against
humanity how will the Contracting Parties go about punishing the
members of these groups? Many of the jihadists have threatened to
commit suicide upon being detained. Sitting them in a courtroom and
putting them into prison cells doesn’t stop them or their organizations. If
anything it only antagonizes them and inspires them to capture, torture,
and kill more innocent people. From their perspective, even upon being
imprisoned or killed while waging jihad, they aren’t being punished. They
consider themselves to be serving God.

The one silver lining amidst the global threat of genocide is that it
forces international cooperation. Countries have to share intelligence with
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one another to fight back against Hamas, ISIS and their affiliates. As it
stands the Genocide Convention and the support offered for preventing
genocide by organizations like the Carnegie Commission haven’t won the
battle against global terrorism. Nonetheless much progress has been and
will continue to be made.

The Genocide Convention is not perfect in text or in practice; no
law is nor is it intended to be. However virtuous laws, including the
Convention, are intended to be proponents of justice and civility. The text
itself has inspired global awareness of the threat of genocide and has
created the opportunity for an elevated level of international cooperation.
It is the interpretation of the law by its Contracting Parties along with the
Supervision of the United Nations that has at times failed to prevent and
or punish for the crime of genocide. They too are not perfect and do not
claim to be. What is certain is that the Convention has the potential to
stifle the threat of genocide given that its Contracting Parties improve
their efforts to collaborate with one another. The public too has a role in
the success or the failure of the Convention. We all must continue to be
critical of the Convention and of those Parties associated with it if we
intend to one day find a permanent solution to the “problem from hell”. 66
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